教員紹介

清滝ふみ

清滝ふみ: 教授/学部長補佐

所属	経済学部総合経済政策学科経済学研究科
学位	博士（経済学）
専門	契約理論、ミクロ経済学
ジャンル	経済/経済理論
コメント	非対称情報のもとでのインセンティブ設計を研究しています。特に、企業組織内での従業員の動機付けの問題を、契約理論を用いて分析しています。
リサーチマップ	https://researchmap.jp/read0194016

学歴/経歴

学歴

- 1999年
関西学院大学経済学研究科
- 1999年
関西学院大学 Graduate School, Division of Economics
- 1994年
関西学院大学経済学部
- 1994年
関西学院大学 Faculty of Economics

研究活動情報

研究分野

人文・社会, 理論経済学

研究キーワード

ゲーム理論, 組織の経済学, 契約理論, 人事の経済学, Personnel Economics

講演・口頭発表等

The opition of sequential alliances for cooperative investments , 清滝ふみ , European Meeting on Game Theory , 2019年7月2日
Do workers negotiate collectively or separately? An application of a coalitional bargaining game with externalities. , 清滝ふみ , Econometric Society , 2017年8月22日

MISC

The Option of Sequential Alliances for Cooperative Investments , Fumi kiyotaki; Toshiji Miyakawa , Kindai Working Papers in Economics , E-48 , 2024年3月
Barriers to Global Free Trade through Bilateral Agreements , Fumi Kiyotaki; Toshiji Miyakawa , Review of International Economics , 21 , 3 , 536 , 548 , 2013年8月
概要：This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in the context of a dynamic noncooperative bargaining game with a random proposer. We show that global free trade (a grand coalition) does not necessarily occur unless transfer payments among countries are allowed. When transfer payments are possible, bilateral FTAs always achieve global free trade, but the ex-ante and ex-post inequalities of social welfare among countries are larger than those when all countries are independent because of the strategic bargaining behavior. © 2013 John Wiley &amp Sons Ltd.
The choice of organizational form under intrafirm bargaining rules , Fumi Kiyotaki; Toshiji Miyakawa , JOURNAL OF THE JAPANESE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIES , 26 , 3 , 369 , 392 , 2012年9月
概要：Kiyotaki, Fumi, and Miyakawa, Toshiji-The choice of organizational form under intrafirm bargaining rules This paper studies the choice of organizational form under incomplete contracts. We identify an organizational form with a rule of ex-post bargaining and compare four types of organization: horizontal organizations, inverted pyramidal hierarchies, pyramidal hierarchies and vertical hierarchies. We show that if the human capital investments of all members are perfectly complementary, the horizontal organization is chosen. If the investments of two players including the owner are essential, the inverted pyramidal hierarchy can occur. Pyramidal hierarchies minimize the agency cost if investments are non-firm-specific. The vertical hierarchy emerges when the owner can motivate a player who undertakes firm-specific investment by assigning him to the middle tier. We also examine who should be assigned to the middle tier in a vertical hierarchy. J. Japanese Int. Economies 26 (3) (2012) 369-392. Faculty of Economics, Kinki University, 3-4-1 Kowakae, Higashiosaka, Osaka 577-8502, Japan; Faculty of Economics, Osaka University of Economics, 2-2-8 Osumi, Higashiyodogawa, Osaka 533-8533, Japan. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.